Save the Children (UK) – Angola

FAMILY TRACING AND REUNIFICATION PROGRAMME

FINAL REPORT

Project Title:	Support to the Family Tracing and Reunification Programme (FTRP)
Country:	Angola
Project Number:	260974
Donor Code:	2611
Funding Period:	1 July 1999 – 31 July, 2002
Aims of Project:	a) To complete the hand-over of responsibilities to the National Children's Department (DNI) within the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS), ensuring good practice. b) To promote effective management by MINARS of Identification, Documentation, Tracing and Reunification (IDTR) work at national and provincial level. c) To enhance awareness on viable interventions for displaced and migrant children, encouraging international and national actors to engage in partnerships with MINARS and advocating for suitable legislative instruments. d) To investigate and test alternatives for a non-nutritional assistance for Angolan children separated from their families.
Distribution:	Save the Children (UK) (hereinafter referred to as Save the Children), DNI and SNT

The final report examines chiefly the last six months of programme implementation, namely the semester January - July 2002. Dramatic changes that occurred in Angola after February '02 justify this emphasis. Those changes have shaped SC UK protection work after completion of FTRP. They constitute the backdrop for a new initiative (Angola Child Recovery Programme - ACREP) that DCOF/USAID has begun funding from October '02.

Previous reports by semester highlighted how programme activities evolved: the final report will just run through a few critical issues, to offer a synthesis for the whole implementation period.

A. Summary

By means of FTRP, MINARS identified more than 18,000 separated children in 3 years (Tab. E-2). 7,800 children were able to return to their families, 41% of all those registered (Tab. E-7 and Fig. I-3). 6,700 - 35% - found foster families.

FTRP ensured a first response to the humanitarian crisis that unfolded directly after the end of the hostilities in March '02. Despite numerous constraints, FTRP was the most important social protection instrument for children affected by the consequences of the conflict in Angola[1].

The humanitarian crisis presented a two-fold challenge. The caseload shot up with a 25% increase of separated children over the previous semester (Tab. E-4) and the geography of child separation changed dramatically (Tab. E-11).

In pursuit of the best interest of the child, SC provided directly technical and material assistance to MINARS provincial teams and to local child protection networks from March '02[2]. SC UK direct engagement at provincial level was part of overall efforts to outline a new partnership between MINARS and SC UK. SC UK clarified that hand-over of management responsibilities to the ministry did not mean withdrawal from a common initiative with MINARS on child protection[3].

SC UK engagement with provincial networks followed an appraisal of the new challenges confronting MINARS. Accessibility of most of the country had led to new demands for the provincial teams, tasked with responses to protection issues arising in distant municipalities and previously inaccessible communes.

---

[1] Annex 1, p. 11.

[2] Annex 3 and 4.

[3] Annex 5.

Increased vulnerability among children and their families coupled with momentous population shifts impinged on MINARS capability to trace family members and link them up with registered children. Although the number of reunions grew significantly in the first semester of 2002 (Tab. E-3), reunited children dropped from 55 to 41% of the registered ones (Fig. I-2 and Tab. E-6).

Fostering – supervised and spontaneous – expanded to become the primary answer to immediate protection needs of separated children. Protection issues related to fostering had been identified since the onset of the crisis[4]. Expansion of fostering would require additional supervision and monitoring. Exponential growth of demands on MINARS provincial teams made it impossible to ensure adequate follow-up for children placed in fostering families. Actually, the number of follow-up visits did increase remarkably (+26%, Tab. E-4), but supervision and monitoring of individual children dropped sharply (Tab. E-8 and Fig. I-4).

The experience of the former demobilisation process suggested that a "network of social structures with community level contacts"[5] might integrate MINARS national and provincial organisations in tackling widespread child protection needs.

Serious social protection problems brought about by the forms taken by the demobilisation process, the extreme vulnerability of girls, the escalation of sexual and gender based violence, concerns about refugee children soon to be repatriated and the array of questions raised by large internal migrations define the new scenario. They emphasise the child protection role of social networks with roots in the local communities.

---

[4] Annex 6 , p. 6.
[5] Beth Verhey, The Prevention, Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers – Angola Case Study, World Bank, 2001, p. 30.

B. Background and overall issues

The Angolan war ended abruptly. After killing more than 1 million, the death of Jonas Savimbi in Lucusse, Moxico, on 22nd February 2002 led first to a memorandum in March[6], then to a cease-fire accord in April[7]. By April 19th, the first UNITA soldiers entered a quartering area[8]. On 2nd August, UNITA officially disbanded its military units and turned to be a purely political organisation[9]. By the end of the year, the areas where UNITA troops and their family have been quartered are planned for closure.

At a first glance, it is not easy to associate the calendar of political events to a dramatic humanitarian crisis. Paradoxically, the smooth progress of the peace process seems to conceal the depth of the crisis. In an attempt to draw attention to the roots of poverty and social exclusion in the country, SC UK took part in a briefing for members of the Security Council about the Angolan situation, on March 5th in New York[10].

A window of opportunity is open: immense oil revenues accruing to the country in the new context of peace should allow a sharp inversion of the process that has impoverished, displaced and deprived of basic services the majority of Angolan children and their communities.

Only the production of the existing oil fields in deep water would grant Angola 160,000 million US dollars in the next 20-30 years, an amount that new discoveries might easily swell[11].

---

[6] The "Lusaka Protocol Complementary Memorandum on the Ceasing Of Hostilities and Further Outstanding Military Matters" ("Memorando de Entendimento Complementar ao Protocolo de Lusaka para Cessação das Hostilidades e Demais Questões Militares Pendentes") was signed in Luena, capital of the province of Moxico, on 30th of March by Gen. Geroldo Nunda, the Angolan army's deputy chief of staff, and Gen. Abreu Kamorteiro, UNITA's military commander.

[7] On 4th April 2002, the Memorandum agreed in Luena on the 30th of March was initialled again, this time by the FAA (Forças Armadas de Angola) chief of staff, Gen. Armando da Cruz Neto, and by Gen. Kamorteiro for UNITA military forces.

[8] In Chiteta, Huambo province.

[9] UNITA disbanded its military units upon integration of 5,000 of its soldiers and generals within the Angolan Army, a process that ran smoothly and ended on 31st of July.

[10] The meeting between members of UN Security Council and four International NGOs was held through an informal mechanism, known as the Arria formula. For Save the Children UK, it was attended by the Regional Director (Deborah Crowe), the Country Programme Director in Angola (Sheri Lecker) and FTRP Programme Manager (Galeano Neto).

[11] Angola: Os Desafios Pós-Guerra. Avaliação Conjunta do País 2002, Sistema das Nações Unidas em Angola, page 72.

4

B-1 - War and polarisation of resources

The military strategy that ended the conflict, defeating UNITA, was a factor in the humanitarian crisis after February 2002. Since the fall of the stronghold in Andulo (Bié) in October 1999, UNITA columns made up of civilians and troopers had been roaming through the bush heading towards the Zambian border, to find it effectively sealed. Chased by the FAAs, unable to harvest and shelled by the Angolan air force, children and women had shared the worst consequences of a defeat meted out by a "scorched earth" campaign. Forced displacement of rural populations towards IDP camps had featured prominently in military tactics.

● *Income inequities and polarisation in wealth distribution compound the impact of war.*

Fig. B-1 Income distribution in % among urban households

The richest 10% of the population commands 42.2% of the total income; the poorest just 1.6%[12]. In 1995, income distribution was less inequitable, as the wealthiest decile garnered 31.5% of the total income and the poorest 3%.

Not only the poorest have been losing ground, but also those urban social groups that do not lie at the bottom of income distribution. Those are likely to be the

---

[12] Ibid. page 61

social tier that has social or kinship ties with children whom extreme poverty or social shocks have forced out of their families.

The dynamics behind Fig. B-1 are immediately relevant for separated children, as fostering – spontaneous or arranged – has been the most common social protection answer apart from reunification to biological families. Reciprocity is critical in traditional fostering[13]. In an impoverished context where the poor and even groups taking the middle rungs in the income ladder see their earnings shrink, the base for reciprocity may fade away.

<u>B-2 - Quartering and demobilisation</u>

Quartering of UNITA fighters and their families caused child protection concerns, too. In mid May a food crisis was uncovered in quartering areas; but till mid June food distribution was erratic and often inadequate.

MINARS dithered before accessing quartering areas, because they were "hot spots" additional to a number of communes just become accessible and because of the political sensitivity that registration of separated children in UNITA managed camps entailed.

Time constraints bore upon quartering and demobilisation. The government stated its intention to wind up the quartering process within the year[14]. However, the resettlement of as many as 350,000 people (roughly, 50,000 combatants and 300,000 civilian relatives) may also be constrained by the end of the planting season (December) and the beginning of heavy rains.

• The timeframe for quartering and demobilisation after the cease-fire in April '02 was radically different from the slow-paced process that followed the Lusaka protocol in November 1994. Then, the first quartering areas opened one year after the accord (November 1995) and the first soldiers were demobilised in September 1996. Now, the first quartering areas opened 15 days after the accord and 50,000 UNITA combatants turned to civilian status in 4 months.

---

[13] *Annex 1, page 23*

[14] <u>Programa para o Regresso e Reassentamento das Populações Afectads Directamente pelo Conflito Armada</u>. The text programme is preceded by a summary "Resumo do Programa Regresso e Reassentamento das Populações Afectadas Directamente pelo Conflito Armado": here the duration of the programme – that include 350,000 UNITA family members – is set for the semester July – December '02.

Contrarily to the lengthy process after Lusaka, this time child focused organisations had to rush to address the institutional, logistic and administrative issues of separated children – and child soldiers – involved in quartering and demobilisation[15].

● The Angolan government retains unique control over financing, distribution and targeting of demobilisation benefits. This is supposed to be run entirely by the government agency Institute for Reintegration of Former Military Personnel (IRSEM).

The lack of demobilisation packages for former combatants coupled with UNITA grip over the quartering areas – often perceived as bases for political power – have contributed to retain population in unsustainable settlements, exposed to any sort of shocks.

B-3 – Child soldiers and kidnapped girls

Registration of child soldiers was a task of the FAAs, while registering UNITA combatants entering the quartering areas. By mid August the Armed Forces declared that no registration had taken place[16].

FAA surprising announcement seemed to dump on MINARS the almost impossible task of identifying child soldiers after their admission in the reception areas where UNITA family members where accommodated. The task was daunting both for its logistic implications and for the attitude of UNITA administration, hardly supportive.

To confuse further the situation, leaks at provincial level seem to show that in several quartering areas under-age military had been registered[17].

The failure by FAA to register any body under the age of 20 years was a missed opportunity to access child soldiers and specifically ensure their

---

[15] See Beth Verhey, The Prevention, Demobilization and Reintegration of Child Soldiers – Angola Case Study, World Bank, 2001, p. 28.

[16] See Aide-Mémoire, Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program Luanda, August 16, 2002 by the Multi-donor Mission that visited Angola from August 5 to 16 to pre-appraise a possible Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program under the framework of the Multicountry Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP); page 4.

[17] Lote August, UNICEF, SC-UK, SC-Norway, SC-Denmark and SC-US received a number of lists of under-age military registered from April '02. 71 should have been registered in the quartering area of Wamba (Uige), 88 in Vale do Loge (Uige), 32 in Matimba (Zaire) and 84 in Chikala (Moxico, here 8 under-age military were fifteen and below).

1

demobilisation, reunify them with their families and support their reintegration and ultimately prevent them from being re-recruited. In response to this the child protection agencies took a broader approach of including child soldiers as part of wider group of vulnerable/separated children focusing on linking them into the family tracing mechanisms and working with community based child protection networks to support their reintegration.

• The detention of abducted girls in the quartering areas raised major worries. On the whole, the first stage of the demobilisation process (from April till August '02) showed alarming signals of spreading sexual and gender based violence.

As documented by other SC UK initiatives[18], war and displacement had been a complex experience in terms of gender power within households and communities. Women and girls had played the pivotal role in ensuring that their families could cope with the crisis. Though in an ambiguous and precarious fashion, they had often seen their power increase. On the contrary, demobilisation tended to be a process centred on men, where women, girls and children played a secondary role. Demobilisation and resettlement of the combatants to their areas of origin could be felt as a return to "normality" also in terms of gender relations.

In April, SC UK officers in Cuando Cubango and in Bié identified serious cases of SGBV, where troopers from both FAA and UNITA were involved[19]. In May, MINARS provincial team in Moxico expressed frustration and concern about the detention of girls between 12 and 14 in the area of Cangumbe by military personnel claiming that these were their wives. Repeatedly, SC UK, MINARS and CCF raised issues of gender bias in the registration process within the quartering areas and illegal detention of girls – as "wives" – by military personnel[20].

B-4 Migrant children and communities

---

[18] The most important are: the project "Conversa no Jango" with Africa Humanitarian Action and the programme "Support to Displaced Women's and Girls' Networks in Angola" co-funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
[19] See Relatório Visita ao Bié, Abril 2002, Programa de Localização e Reunifcação Familiar de Crianças, by Galeano Neto and Manuela Costa, and Programa de Localização e Reunifcação Social, Relatorio das Actividades Desenvolvidas no Periodo de 18 a 20 de Abril de 2002, Provincia Kuando Kubango, by Ana Lemba.
[20] See Annex 7 and 8.

From April to August 2002, more than 430,000 people have spontaneously resettled in areas of origin or in newly accessible areas. Just in the 2 provinces of Huambo and Bié - once epicentre of the conflict - 150,000 people have abandoned IDP camps to start a new life somewhere else[21].

The *Planos de Acção Povinciais de Emergência para o Reassentamento e Regresso* (PAPERR – Provincial Emergency Action Plans for Resettlement and Return) intend to "facilitate the return and resettlement of internally displaced persons"[22]. They target 1,749,867 people (350,696 families) that should resettle in the next months: 1,576,587 in the same province where they currently are, 173,280 in a different province[23].

Those targeted in the PAPERR are a minority of the displaced people. According to government estimates in May 2002 there were 4,010,000 internally displaced in the country, 30% of the total population[24]

More than 450,000 Angolan refugees[25] are located in neighbouring countries, the majority in Zambia. Various accounts indicate a large number of separated children within refugee camps. They may move back to Angola at the beginning of 2003.

● In 1970, 14% of the population lived in urban areas. This figure moved to 42% in 1996. According to the National Statistic Institute (INE) 60% of the Angolan population in 2001 was settled in towns and cities: one of the highest urbanisation rate in the world. Luanda is believed to accommodate 3.28 million people, namely 23% of the people in the country.

A few approaches by the government emphasise "return and resettlement" as answers to the forms that urbanisation has taken in Angola, where migrations to urban areas of displaced populations "have been choking the large cities of the country, especially on the coast"[26].

---

[21] *Grupo de Coordenação Humanitária - Setembro de 2002.*

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Angola: Os Desafios Pós-Guerra. Avaliação Conjunta do País 2002, Sistema das Nações Unidas em Angola, page 14.

[25] Ibid., page 58.

[26] Programa para o Regresso e Reassentamento das Populações Afectads Directamente pelo Conflito Armada, page 5.

• As a matter of fact, de-urbanisation of Angola is impossible, provided the resettlement process keeps voluntary.

The polarisation of resources is such that coastal cities are powerful magnets. Notwithstanding government's auspices, further population shifts from rural to urban areas could occur - or from provincial capitals in the interiors to coastal cities – if essential services and livelihood opportunities are not promptly assured in the resettlement sites.

Angola is the Southern Africa country with the lowest public spending rate in social services. Health and education accounted for only 10% of government expenditures in 2001. The geographical concentration of these expenditures makes the conditions of the most vulnerable even more appalling. Out of the more than 500 communes where people are expected to resettle the large majority are in the interiors (none in Luanda province), often in quite remote settings. Save the Children officers that have been visiting a few resettlement sites have a dismal picture of the situation.

In the resettlement sites, services are neither available nor planned, people are facing severe food shortage, seeds and farming tools have not been supplied.

In a few cases[27], people have abandoned IDP camps to settle in areas that may become completely inaccessible to humanitarian aids during the rainy season.

A failure of the resettlement plan for displaced population and for those quartered waiting for completion of the demobilisation process may lead to chaotic rush of population towards the few serviced areas, the coastal cities in particular. Child separation could aggravate and social protection options for separated children could shrink.

• On 5th January 2001, the Government passed the decree n. 1/01 "Norms on the Resettlement of the Internally Displaced Populations". The norms aim at ensuring the voluntary character of resettlement (art. 5), security (art. 4), free access to sufficient land (art. 3), access to essential services (art. 7, 8 and 9).

The implementation of decree 1/01 is critical to set up community based social protection networks meeting the needs of the most vulnerable children. These may be kidnapped girls often responsible for their children as single mothers, separated children moving from IDP camps and UNITA areas, unaccompanied

---

[27] For instance in the municipalities of Umpulo and Ringoma (Bié province).

10

adolescents who may have lost any contact with the families of origin and have to attempt an independent living.

C. Save the Children's partnership with MINARS

C-1 - Issues

A few issues deserved particular attention in the last phase of the programme.

C-1.1 - Increase caseload and change in its composition

The term of the USAID DCOF grant for the implementation of FTRP came at a critical moment, when the caseload shot up and its composition changed.

The number of registered children increased by almost $\frac{1}{4}$ over the previous semester.

Even during intense military confrontation, the severe socio-economic conditions of the country (64% of the population under the poverty line, 25% in extreme poverty, namely with income less than 0.75 USD/day[28]) had accounted for a significant share of the caseload. Luanda – where poverty is likely to be the main case of child separation – represented 20% of the children registered in the whole year 2001[29].

The humanitarian crisis in the fist part of 2002, meant that Luanda passed to a relatively small percentage of the total caseload (6.85%), with a number of registered children that was one third of Moxico's and one half of Huambo's (Tab. E-11).

Programme strategies, which had been conceived for the previous caseload and its composition, could fail to address the new circumstances. FTRP response in Moxico, in Huambo and – probably – in Kuando Kubango became relatively much more relevant[30].

---

[28] Angola: Os Desafios Pós-Guerra. Avaliação Conjunta do País 2002, Sistema das Nações Unidas em Angola, page 20.

[29] With the escalation of the fighting in the second semester of 2001, this share had reduced to 16% and Bié had become the province with more registered children, overtaking Luanda.

[30] The caseload in Kuando Kubango did not skyrocket. This might mean that the humanitarian crisis did not reach the intensity of Moxico or Huambo or – instead – that FTRP response was comparatively inferior, also in the registration of separated children.

C-1.2 - Upsurge of provincial powers

Victory over UNITA and new accessibility of large part of the national territory accelerated the upsurge of provincial powers. Policies settled in Luanda were to be implemented in vast provincial territories, where local potentates were effectively the unique source of authority.

Policy decisions such as non-institutionalisation of child-care could be revoked locally[31]; priorities established nationally were constrained by local resources - for instance transportation means - controlled by the provincial government. Increase role of MINARS in reintegration and resettlement meant that provincial governors had more reasons to intervene in the activities of MINARS provincial directors, whom they appoint and manage.

The PAPERR (Provincial Emergency Action Plans for Resettlement and Return) were drawn at provincial level and their implementation is entrusted to local governments.

The role of the National Supervisory Team of DNI (Departimento Nacional da Infancia) and its relevance turned into a moot point.

C-1.3 A new operational landscape

The security envelope around the provincial capitals had been the environment where FTRP had operated since 1999. Tracing family members beyond those borders was extremely dangerous, while placement and reunification of children was arranged only where security was assured.

From April '02, centres located hundreds of kilometres away from the provincial capitals became the new operational landscape. Communities that had been cut-off during the conflict lived there, thousands of displaced people resettled in those centres.

The importance of a web of contacts reaching out into provinces larger than Portugal (Moxico is two times and a half larger than its former "mainland") grew enormously. Only a few social institutions had such a network and often MINARS provincial teams had to learn how to relate with those institutions.

---

[31] See Annex 6.

C-1.4 Incentives

Incentives to MINARS teams have been the most controversial element in FTRP project design. Critical how they were to keep provincial teams going, they also caused distortions. The worst was a bias towards activities located close to the MINARS provincial offices, as there was no incentive for travelling, while the sheer numbers of reunified and placed children got the biggest award.

While proximity to MINARS provincial headquarters was an acceptable enough constrain till April '02 – indeed very few activities could take place further than 30 kilometres from the city centre -, lack of mobility and incentives that did not promote an expansion of the radius of operations became an issue afterwards.

C-2 – Responses

C-2.1 – A new partnership around family tracing

The escalation in the number of children registered by the programme and the call for new strategies to tackle unprecedented aspects of 2002 emergency made MINARS query SC UK intentions and commitment after July 2002. 12 years of excellent partnership were confronted by new challenges: the context for a hand-over of responsibility to MINARS had changed.

Since the presentation to MINARS of the document *"Visão Estrategica <<Para Alem de Julho 2002>>"* in October 2001, SC UK had committed support to MINARS also after July 2002[32]. This spanned identification, documentation, tracing and reunification (IDTR) of separated children as well as their reintegration within communities of origin or of choice.

SC UK underlined that a new partnership had to explore areas of collaboration where technical assistance was required beside the financial and logistic one. Those were areas such as supervision and assistance to fostering and, issues of access to basic services for vulnerable children and their families through community based child protection networks.

The growing caseload highlighted the relevance of a functional database. A national consultant was hired in February '02 for 2 months. He came up with a

---

[32] See Annex 5, page 7.

three-phase strategy. The first steps addressed the need to increase autonomy and responsiveness at sub-national level, improving inter-provincial (regional) flows of information. The final step intended to improve communication links among the 18 provinces so to achieve an ideal information system, with data flows in real time. Implementation of the first steps kicked off in April '02[33]. The second and third stages are intended for the new partnership between SC UK and MINARS.

Hand-over meant recognition that FTRP had become a national government programme; it did not mean withdrawal from the partnership. This point was brought off in June '02, with key inputs from the international consultant for the review of the programme[34].

The new operational context required multi-lateral partnership around the national family tracing and reunification programme. Not only were the technical inputs multiple, also the need to be operational at communal and municipal levels called for new commitments. Beside UNICEF and CCF, whose role had been stressed since October '01, other members of the Save the Children Alliance (SC-US, SC-Norway and SC-Denmark) were asked to join common planning of child protection work, focused on separated children.

A child protection group started meeting in June '02[35], initially involving MINARS, SC UK, CCF and UNICEF, then enlarged to other Save the Children Alliance members[36].

C-2.2 Direct engagement at provincial level

The relevance of provincial decision making institutions and the new operational importance of communes and municipalities led SC to engage directly with MINARS provincial teams and provincial partners.

A long-term reintegration strategy depends on decisions taken by provincial and municipal state actors and on resources mobilised locally. SC could not help

---

[33] See Annex 9.

[34] See Annex 1.

[35] See Annex 1, page 8.

[36] SC US work in Kwanza Sul and in the critical province of Moxico, SC Norway in Zaire and SC Denmark in Uíge. It is fair to say that after the conclusion of FTRP in July '02, the child protection group ran into significant problems, that led to interruptions in its work. As to October 2002, however, this level of co-ordination turned operational again.

14

recognising it and the inevitably diminishing role of DNI national supervisory team.

MINARS provincial teams' performance – rather heterogeneous – confirmed the need of local engagement. A few teams had been running efficiently for the whole of the programme (e.g. Bié) and faced the new crisis with reasonable confidence. Others required direct inputs from SC UK (e.g. Moxico and Malange), streamlining procedures, enhancing networking and ensuring adequate supplies: this led to remarkable improvements. Others appeared extremely weak (e.g. Cuando Cubango) at the onset of the new emergency and the progress was slow and hindered.

In April '02, SC UK recruited 2 new officers to engage directly with 6 provincial teams and local partnerships. A third officer was tasked with this provincial support, changing her previous assignments in the programme[37]. They were managed by SC UK FTRP co-ordinator[38]. The provinces where SC UK provided direct support and supervision were Moxico, Cuando Cubango, Uíge, Bié, Malange and Huambo[39].

The six provinces identified are within the first seven positions in table E-11, which may confirm that the choice was correct and it paid off.

Admittedly, there was a risk of backlash within DNI national supervisory team, although the reaction was initially moderate. It is believed that a comprehensive engagement by SC UK with MINARS, in the context of resettlement of displaced communities and reintegration of children affected by the conflict, can soothe possible disquiet within DNI supervisory team.

C-2.3 Partnership with social networks

To expand the programme outreach, MINARS provincial teams had to gather new local resources around FTRP and strengthen their networking skills.

Other government agencies and bodies have been critical targets for provincial networking. MINARS teams had to negotiate with the governors, with the delegations of the Ministry of Education, with provincial MINFAMU (Ministry

---

[37] Ana Lemba had been working on gender issues among separated and displaced children.
[38] Galeano Neto.
[39] See Annex 4.

for the Promotion of the Role of the Woman and for the Family), with the police and with the local FAA commanders.

With a view to supporting reintegration within local communities, MINARS teams began discussing with a few municipal authorities (though most of them are still rather weak).

Training sessions on key tracing and reunification skills were run again in the six provinces, providing the local partner agencies with basic expertise to join in[40].

State administration in large swathes of the national territory is either relatively weak or just established. Though the presence of state authorities is a prerequisite for resettlement (Decree n. 1/01, "Norms on the Resettlement of the Internally Displaced Populations"), this is often a tiny presence.

Social institutions with capacity to reach most communities exist, however. Churches have a presence through a net of community activists that often reach as far as the most remote hamlets. The past CCF experience with the "*catequista*" networks suggested interesting considerations.

MINARS teams were assisted in developing a balanced approach to these social networks.

Community activists linked to churches and based in their communities are likely not to have tracing skills, as those skills go beyond a good knowledge of the territory. Social institutions may have different and sometimes even competing agendas.

Local church activists can become precious assets, if supported and trained. Beyond their role in tracing – which often is rather new to most of them – they may become the foundation for social safety nets at community levels, in urban slums and in rural communities. Community safety nets may become essential for reintegrating children affected by the conflict, providing safe transit environments for separated children heading towards distant communities and supervising fostering of those who could not find their families of origin.

Networking with social institutions that may promote community based safety nets for children affected by the war imply development of new abilities within

---

[40] Though MINARS provincial teams attended the training, their role was more that of resource persons. Indeed, almost all the teams in the six provinces had adequate IDTR expertise. The exception was regrettably in Cuando Cubango.

MINARS provincial teams. The appraisal of their role has to take into account how responsive social networks can be in counteracting gender-based discrimination or abuse[41]. Often, community activists have to acquire skills to communicate with vulnerable children. In many social institutions – as well as government agencies – acceptance of children's right to participation has still to grow.

SC UK officers reported a few interesting breakthroughs within MINARS teams. The Moxico team managed to effectively advocate against large institutionalisation of child-care (with provincial MINFAMU, provincial government and, to an extent, MINARS provincial director too). In Malange, MINARS established a positive collaboration with local churches and members of church-based organisations were included as volunteers in the FTRP team.

Relationships were established with church-based women's organisations (e.g. Pro-Maika in Moxico), with social welfare associations (e.g. Caritas in Uíge and Malange), with individual churches (dioceses of Moxico and Uíge, and – to a lesser extent – the Adventist church). The provincial teams in Uíge, Bié, Moxico and Malange developed important networking abilities, while in Huambo and particularly in Cuando Cubango SC UK officers encountered a less responsive environment.

C-2.4 Cancellation of incentives

Incentives paid to MINARS teams in the provinces had been conceived to support any IDTR step. USD 2 were paid for the registration of separated children, USD 5 for a monitoring visit and USD 10 for tracing of a family member, for reunification or for placement in a foster family.

Looking at Tab. E-5, E-3 and E-4, we cannot find evidence that the structure of incentives determined where MINARS teams concentrated their efforts. Activities awarded with larger incentives, such as the tracing of members of children's biological families, show a declining trend (Fig. I-2). Incentives cannot explain why reunification numbers do not keep up with the figures of registered children.

The structure of incentives has not helped MINARS make the leap forward required by the new situation. Primarily logistic constraints (transport and

---

[41] See Annex 10, where the report on a training session for provincial partners highlights lack of gender awareness among the "*catequistas*".

communication), then security concerns (inadequate de-mining) have held back a rapid expansion of the radius of operations; however, incentives thought for the contracted environment during the military confrontation have not eased those constraints.

Already in October 2001, and with more determination after February '02, SC UK indicated that the system of incentives appeared unsustainable and lacked justification in the new context. In general, resources for the expansion of a well-established government programme have to be identified within an expanded budget for social services; the payment of incentives may end up integrating the poor salaries of government officials, without promoting more effective implementation.

The cancellation of incentives after July '02 does not seem to have had major repercussions on the work by provincial teams. In Uíge, a comparison between data in July '02 and August '02 does not bear out a particular impact:

Tab. C-1 – Change in % from July to August 2002 in Uíge

Caseload by components	July 2002	August 2002	Change in %
Registered children	36	115	219%
Traced family members	15	14	-7%
Placed children	15	0	-100%
Reunited children	30	27	-10%
Registered adults	9	10	11%
Follow-up visits	76	81	7%

D. FTRP IDTR functions

• The programme has been able to identify and document a significant number of separated children in the whole country. It has proved responsive and has provided appropriate warning signals on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in several key provinces.

The tracing forms adopted are generally well known to MINARS staff that seems at ease in using them.

• A substantial rise in the percentage of children whose family members were traced occurred between the 1st semester of 1999 and the 2nd semester of

2000, from 35% to 78%. Afterwards, this ratio dropped, passing from 78% to 41% in the 1st semester of 2002.

It seems that with an increase in caseload, the provincial teams do not have sufficient human and material resources to carry out effective tracing. This suggests also that the tracing forms should collect more tracking information.

It is worth noticing – however – that the number of traced family members have constantly risen (Tab. E-3).

• Facing a growth in the caseload and difficulties in tracing and reunifying children with their families, FTRP teams turned often to fostering as a non-institutional answer to increased child protection needs.

Though fostering may be a viable transitory response, it cannot substitute reunification on a large scale. It is important to retain focus on family reunification and an approach to fostering that underlines its provisional character.

As to the absolute number of reunited children, we may remark that in the last semester of the programme this figure increased significantly (+700).

• On the average, supervision of fostered and reunited children has proved a challenge, as only half of the reunited or fostered children received supervision visits. The increasing relevance of fostering makes it critical to invest resources in monitoring

E - Statistic Evidence

Tab. E-1 Breakdown by province

Province	Children registered		Traced family members		Placed children		Reunited children		Registered adults		Follow-up visits	
	II sem 2001	I sem 2002	II sem 2001	I sem 2002	II sem 2001	I sem 2002	II sem 2001	I sem 2002	II sem 2001	I sem 2002	II sem 2001	I sem 2002
Bengo	134	179	74	89	59	149	67	99	68	22	84	18
Bie	750	614	402	361	394	410	394	364	220	257	694	686
Benguela	242	316	98	187	102	130	101	174	61	47	110	115
Huambo	564	884	221	358	210	666	132	320	64	76	270	1,010
Huila	199	302	223	167	81	96	123	184	35	34	88	24
K-Sul	513	107	42	61	26	67	36	99	36	17	41	33
K-Kubang	251	356	163	129	175	214	126	156	25	35	40	99
K-Norte	45	84	30	0	0	0	6	22	21	3	0	0
Luanda	743	395	712	108	221	183	585	287	520	140	406	35
L-Norte	58	10	36	4	37	5	32	0	13	2	15	0
L-Sul	72	27	40	12	35	3	33	10	5	4	12	3
Moxico	532	1,349	207	347	377	1,052	144	420	229	237	208	502
Malange	206	610	127	383	84	79	114	432	43	228	132	165
Namibe	58	12	31	2	24	0	26	2	9	2	15	0
Uíge	231	364	118	122	146	61	99	138	77	65	117	142
Cunene	0	98	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	37	0	0
Cabinda	22	0	14	0	9	0	10	0	8	0	0	0
Zaire	25	57	16	12	5	1	8	2	8	3	24	0
Total	4,645	5,764	2,554	2,342	1,985	3,116	2,036	2,709	1,442	1,209	2,256	2,832

20

Tab. E-2 – Breakdown by programme components / totals

Caseload by components	1st Jul.1999 – 30th June 2002
Registered children	18,927
Traced family members	10,279
Placed children	6,711
Reunited children	7,796
Registered adults	3,803
Follow-up visits	6,951

Tab. E-3 – Breakdown by programme components / by semester

Caseload by components	I semester 1999 [1]	II semester 1999	I semester 2000	II semester 2000	I semester 2001	II semester 2001	I semester 2002
Registered children	966	1,322	1,601	2,475	3,120	4,645	5,764
Traced family members	339	555	1,056	1,942	1,830	2,554	2,342
Placed children	49	184	313	553	713	1,985	3,116
Reunited children	380	551	957	1,997	1,582	2,036	2,709
Registered adults	288	423	673	630	868	1,442	1,209
Follow-up visits	301	845	687	1,110	1,477	2,256	2,832

(1) Figures from the first semester 1999 concern MINARS activities supported by SC UK but not included in FTRP, as this programme started in July '99.

Tab. E-4 – Change in % from II semester 2001 to I semester 2002

Caseload by components	II semester 2001	I semester 2002	Change in %
Registered children	4,645	5,764	24%
Traced family members	2,554	2,342	-8%
Placed children	1,985	3,116	57%
Reunited children	2,036	2,709	33%
Registered adults	1,442	1,209	-16%
Follow-up visits	2,256	2,832	26%

Fig. I-1

Tab. E-5 – Breakdown by programme components / by year (1999 – 2001)

Caseload by components	1999 [1]	2000	Change in %	2000	2001	Change in %
Registered children	2,288	4,076	78%	4,076	7,765	91%
Traced family members	894	2,998	235%	2,998	4,384	46%
Placed children	233	866	272%	866	2,545	194%
Reunited children	931	2,954	217%	2,954	3,618	22%
Registered adults	711	1,303	83%	1,303	2,310	77%
Follow-up visits	1,146	1,797	57%	1,797	3,742	108%

(1) Activities carried out before July '99 (beginning of FTRP funding period) are included in the figures for 1999. Actually, SC UK support to MINARS tracing and reunification programmes began in the early nineties.

23

Tab. E-6 – Rate of success in tracing children's family members [= <u>Traced family members</u> / <u>Registered children</u>]

Semester	Rate of success	Trend [1]
I semester 1999	35%	NA
II semester 1999	42%	+20%
I semester 2000	66%	+57%
II semester 2000	78%	+18%
I semester 2001	59%	-24%
II semester 2001	55%	-7%
I semester 2002	41%	-25%
July '99 – June '02	54%	NA

(1) Trend = (<u>rate in period n</u> – <u>rate in period n-1</u>) / (<u>rate in period n-1</u>)

Fig. I-2 Rates of success in tracing family members

—◆— Rates of success in tracing family members

Tab. E-7 – Answers to protection needs of separated children

Semester	Fostering [1]	Reunification [2]	Other [3]
I semester 1999	5%	39%	56%
II semester 1999	14%	42%	44%
I semester 2000	20%	60%	20%
II semester 2000	22%	81%	-3%
I semester 2001	23%	51%	26%
II semester 2001	43%	44%	13%
I semester 2002	54%	47%	-1%
July '99 – June '02	35%	41%	24%

(1) (Placed children / Registered children)
(2) (Reunited children / Registered children)
(3) (Registered children – Placed children – Reunited children) / (Registered children)

Fig. I-3 Answers to protection needs

Tab. E-8 – Follow-up visits [= Follow-up visits / (Placed children + Reunited children)]

Semester	Follow-up visits per fostered/reunited child	Change in %
I semester 1999	0.7	NA
II semester 1999	1.15	64%
I semester 2000	0.54	-53%
II semester 2000	0.44	-19%
I semester 2001	0.64	45%
II semester 2001	0.56	-12%
I semester 2002	0.49	-13%
July '99 – June '02	0.48	--

Fig. I-4 Follow-up visits

Tab. E-9 – Reunited children by age group

Age group	II semester 2000	%	I semester 2001	%	II semester 2001	%	I semester 2002	%
0 - 5	644	32%	366	23%	531	26%	559	21%
6 - 13	1,017	51%	801	51%	981	48%	1,443	53%
14 - 18	336	17%	415	26%	524	26%	707	26%
Total	1,997	100%	1,582	100%	2,036	100%	2,709	100%

Tab. E-10 – Registered children by gender

Gender	I Semester 2001	%	II Semester 2001	%	I Semester 2002	%
Female	1,336	43%	2,061	44%	2,690	47%
Male	1,784	57%	2584	56%	3,074	53%
Total	3,120	100%	4,645	100%	5,764	100%

Tab. E-11 – Registered children: caseload by province

Province	Children registered					
	II Semester 2001	%	Rank	I Semester 2002	%	Rank
Bie	750	16.15%	1	614	10.65%	3
Luanda	743	16.00%	2	395	6.85%	5
Huambo	564	12.14%	3	884	15.34%	2
Moxico	532	11.45%	4	1,349	23.40%	1
K-Sul	513	11.04%	5	107	1.86%	11
K-Kubango	251	5.40%	6	356	6.18%	7
Benguela	242	5.21%	7	316	5.48%	8
Uige	231	4.97%	8	364	6.32%	6
Malange	206	4.43%	9	610	10.58%	4
Huila	199	4.28%	10	302	5.24%	9
Bengo	134	2.88%	11	179	3.11%	10
L-Sul	72	1.55%	12	27	0.47%	15
Namibe	58	1.25%	13	12	0.21%	16
L-Norte	58	1.25%	14	10	0.17%	17
K-Norte	45	0.97%	15	84	1.46%	13
Zaire	25	0.54%	16	57	0.99%	14
Cabinda	22	0.47%	17	0	0%	18
Cunene	0	0.00%	18	98	1.70%	12
Total	4,645	100%		5,764	100%	

F - Recommendations

I.   The resettlement process - spontaneous and organised - constitutes the key aspect of the new scenario that the programme has to take into account in the next months. In the longer term, substantial internal and cross-border migrations will be the challenges to address in a child protection perspective.

II.   Separated children leaving IDP camps and UNITA areas throughout the country should be helped to reach their communities of origin or of choice. The focus of FTRP should shift from IDP camps and UNITA areas to the sites where children will settle. This should be complemented with the development of community based child protection networks with recognition that reunification of separated children is the first step in the reintegration process.

III.   In the short term, separated children in transit towards their chosen destinations are a very vulnerable group. Community based services for children in transit are an option that the programme should develop.

IV.   Exit strategies from UNITA areas have to be developed as a matter of urgency and must focus on the most vulnerable groups, separated children in particular. The family-tracing programme has to be integrated within those strategies.

V.   In the longer term, a possible failure to settle in rural areas - both spontaneous and official resettlement sites - may trigger migrations of vulnerable children towards better-serviced urban areas. This will very much depend on government commitment to implements the "Norms on the Resettlement of the Internally Displaced Populations". Child oriented organisations should be ready to ensure child protection for migrating children, who may fail to resettle.

VI.   The current programme focus might play down poverty-induced child separation: war and its consequences have been the key causes of separation in the last semester. In the long run, the enormous polarisation of resources and the sheer number of those living in extreme poverty are likely to bring back the issue of voluntary separation, especially for children forced by poverty to leave their communities for the most affluent urban areas. Strategies to address voluntary separation for children migrating to the coastal cities are essential. This can be integrated into Save the Children's ongoing children in urban poverty work in Luanda.

29

VII. The National Family Tracing Programme information systems need to be strengthened particularly around tracking information of children in transit. This will imply (1) a revision of the registration forms to emphasise tracking elements, (2) support to communication and transport for MINARS teams, (3) better information flows between provinces, (4) promotion of multiple tracing methods, such as radio (5) involvement of social networks in active tracing.

VIII. With an anticipated increase in fostering in the current context of return and resettlement there is a need to review systems of interim care with an emphasis of protection of children in substitute families.